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EQUITY'S BILL OF DISCOVERY:
A UNIQUE APPLICATION IN THE FIELD OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
In the past five to ten years, litigation in the area of products liability has
substantially increased. Prior to 1962, an injured party who brought a products
liability suit would base his action upon either a negligence or breach of war-
ranty theory. Under both forms of recovery obstacles often minimized the
chances for success. In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc.,' the California
Supreme Court held the doctrine of strict liability in tort applied to cases
involving liability for injuries caused by defective products. Because this
decision provided a new method of recovery, the number of suits brought in
products liability has substantially increased.
This comment will explore one type of fact situation which often arises in
the area of products liability: A, while in the employ of B, suffers bodily injury
while operating machinery in the course of employment. An action in products
liability could exist on the premise that the injury resulted from a faulty or
defective machine. The injured party, A, is afforded a remedy in most instances
through workmen's compensation insurance.2 But a problem arises when A
seeks to recover damages for the injury against the manufacturer because the
machine was defective. Recovery under this approach would not be determined
by a fixed schedule and could thus afford a more realistic compensation for the
actual injury suffered.
Before A has reasonable grounds for filing a suit against the manufacturer,
he must first have in his possession the manufacturer's name and, of greater
importance, evidence which would tend to prove that the injury was the proxi-
mate result of a defect in the machine. A's best interests are served when these
requirements are fulfilled prior to filing suit. Both on the federal3 and state4
1 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rep. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.5 (1971).
No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer, his
insurer, his broker, any service organization retained by the employer, his insurer
or his broker to provide safety service, advice or recommendations for the employer
or the agents or employees of any of them for injury or death sustained by any
employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the
compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the
provisions of this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the
legal representatives of his estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages
for such injury. (note: said Act does not prohibit a suit against the manufacturer
of a defective machine).
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a) :
(1) Petition. A person who desires to perpetuate his own testimony or that of
another person regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any court of the
United States may file a verified petition in the United States district court in the
district of the residence of any expected adverse party. The petition shall be
entitled in the name of the petitioner and shall show: 1, that the petitioner expects
to be a party to an action cognizable in a court of the United States but is
presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought, 2, the subject matter of
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levels, procedures exist which permit the taking of depositions prior to proposed
litigation. The provisions "are not designated for discovering grounds for bring-
ing action, but only for perpetuating evidence already known." 5 They do not
provide for discovery as our example requires.
The injured party could file a suit based upon his injuries; however, to
recover he should have in his possession evidence which would show the injury
was the proximate result of a defect in the machine. Such evidence might be
secured by photographing, expertly inspecting, or impounding the machine.
Since the pre-trial procedures are not broad enough to encompass these situa-
tions, the injured party will find his need satisfied only by equity's bill of dis-
covery.
This comment will analyze how equity's bill of discovery can be used prior
to litigation, to secure books, documents and other things in the possession of the
employer and, when necessary, to ascertain the proper party defendant. Such
information will enable A to determine whether an action in products liability
against the manufacturer of the machine would lie.
PURE BILL OF DISCOVERY
Historically, equity's bill of discovery was most often utilized after a com-
plaint was filed. Even at common law, however, facts arose where a bill of dis-
covery seeking information was needed prior to the commencement of an action
at law, but at no time in pursuit of relief.6 This rarer form of the bill is referred
to as equity's "pure bill of discovery." The court in Peyton v. Werhane' stated:
the expected action and his interest therein, 3, the facts which he desires to
establish by the proposed testimony and his reasons for desiring to perpetuate
it, 4, the name or a description of the persons he expects will be adverse parties
and their addresses so far as known, and 5, the names and addresses of the
persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony which he expects to
elicit from each, and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to take the
depositions of the persons to be examined named in the petition, for the purpose
of perpetuating their testimony.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110A, § 2 17(a) (1971):
(1) Petition. A person who desires to perpetuate his own testimony or that of
another person regarding any matter that is or may be cognizable in any court
or proceeding may file a verified petition into the court of the county in which
the action or proceeding might be brought or had or in which one or more of the
persons to be examined reside. The petition shall be entitled in the name of the
petitioner as petitioner and against all other expected parties or interested persons,
including unknown owners, as respondents and shall show: (i) the facts which
he desires to establish by the proposed testimony and his reasons for desiring to
perpetuate it, (ii) the names or a description of the persons interested or whom he
expects will be adverse parties and their addresses so far as known, and (iii)
the names and addresses of the persons to be examined, and shall ask for an
order authorizing the petitioner to take the depositions of the persons to be
examined named in the petition for the purpose of perpetuating their testimony.
5 Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 Tenn. L. Rev.
737, 744 (1937).
6 S. Puterbaugh, Ill. Chancery Pleadings & Practice, 511 (7th ed. 1930).
7 126 Conn. 382, 11 A.2d 800 (1940).
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There is a distinction between the bill of discovery and relief and what
is technically considered a 'pure bill of discovery.' The latter is to
obtain evidence to be used in some suit other than that in which dis-
covery is sought. Pure bills of discovery are favored in equity and are
sustained in all cases, unless some well-founded objection exists against
the exercise of the court's jurisdiction.5 [Emphasis supplied]
In Peyton the plaintiff, a widow, wished to secure information which would
allow her to obtain an extension of time for presenting her claim against her
late husband's estate in the probate court. Equity entertained the bill for dis-
covery to satisfy plaintiff's need so that a basis for commencing a suit at a later
time could be established.
The pure bill was also applied in Coca Cola Corp. v. City of Atlanta."
The City of Atlanta wanted the names of the stockholders in Coca Cola Corp.
who resided in Atlanta so that a tax assessment could be levied. In a similar
case, Brown v. McDonald,10 equity's bill of discovery was also granted. The
plaintiff alleged that stock was registered in the name of a nominal holder
and the bill was brought to determine the real owners.
As recently as 1969 the Illinois appellate court sustained equity's pure
bill of discovery in City oj Chicago v. Hart Building Corp." The plaintiff, City
of Chicago, filed only a bill for discovery. The bill was not ancillary to any
other pending proceeding. The city sought to recover information from a
receiver who had been discharged. The information requested was in the posses-
sion of the defendant and not available to the plaintiff. The court pointed out
that the nature of the proceedings filed by the City of Chicago was an equitable
bill of discovery. Further, the court stated: "we hold that no error was committed
when the city commenced these proceedings with its petition for disclosure."', 2
Ample authority thus exists to sustain a bill of discovery which is not ancillary
to a pending suit. This fact is very significant when applied to the products
liability example. The bill permits the injured party to determine if a cause of
action exists without first filing a complaint. If a complaint were filed, the
injured party, through statutory discovery techniques, might determine that no
grounds exist for holding the manufacturer liable. Thus he might expose him-
self to the sanctions of Sec. 41 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act' 3 designed to
s Id. at 803.
9 152 Ga. 558, 110 S.E. 730 (1922).
10 133 F. 897 (3d Cir. 1905).
11 116 Ill. App. 2d 39, 253 N.E.2d 496, cert. den. 398 U.S. 950 (1969).
12 Id. at 49, 253 N.E.2d at 501.
13 II. Rev. Stat. ch. 110 § 41:
Untrue Statements.) Allegations and denials, made without reasonable cause and
not in good faith, and found to be untrue, shall subject the party pleading them to
the payment of reasonable expenses, actually incurred by the other party by reason
of the untrue pleading, together with a reasonable attorney's fee, to be summarily
taxed by the court at the trial.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
deter the filing of spurious pleadings. Moreover, this approach is time consum-
ing, expensive, and often requires the taking of numerous depositions. The
machine would still have to be inspected, but the defect which caused the injury
may have been corrected to permit the employer's continued use of the machine.
Thus A's basis for commencing the action might no longer exist.
ExAMINATION AND INSPECTION OF POTENTIAL EVIDENCE
"In common practice the purpose of discovery is to obtain evidence for
use at the trial."'1 4 The major import of the bill of discovery becomes evident
when applied to the products liability example. In order for the injured party
to determine whether sufficient grounds exist to file a suit against the manu-
facturer of the machine, he must first determine if the machine's malfunctioning
caused the injury. The bill of discovery would provide a means for such a
determination.
Every bill is, in reality, a bill of discovery; but the species of bill
usually distinguished by the title is a bill for discovery of facts resting
in the knowledge of the defendant, or of deeds or writings, or other
things, in his custody or power. 15
Federal' 6 and state' statutes allow for the inspection of documents, objects
or tangible things; however, inspection is permitted only after the suit is com-
menced. As already explained, equity's bill of discovery provides for the in-
14 Brusselback v. Cago Corp., 20 F. Supp. 293, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
15 Mitford & Tyler, Equity Pleading & Practice 151 (1876) (emphasis added).
16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a):
Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce and
permit the party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf, to inspect
and copy, any designated documents (including writings, drawings, graphs, charts,
photographs, phono-records, and other data compilations from which information
can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by form), or to inspect and copy, test,
or sample any tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the
scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in the possession, custody or control of the
party upon whom the request is served; or (2) to permit entry upon designated
land or other property in the possession or control of the party upon whom the
request is served for the purpose of inspection and measuring, surveying, photo-
graphing, testing, or sampling the property or any designated object or operation
thereon, within the scope of Rule 26 (b).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110A, § 214 (1971)
At any time after the commencement of an action any party may move for an
order directing any other party or person to produce for inspection, copying,
reproduction, and photographing specified documents, objects, or tangible things,
or to permit access to real estate for the purpose of making surface or subsurface
inspections or surveys or photographs, or to disclose information calculated to lead
to the discovery of the whereabout of any of these items, whenever the nature,
contents, or condition of such documents, objects, tangible things, or real estate
is relevant to the subject matter of the action. On the hearing the court may make
any order that may be just. If the party or person claims that the item is not in his
possession or control or that he does not have information calculated to lead
to discovery of its whereabouts, he may be ordered to submit to examination in
open court or by deposition regarding such claim. If requested, the party producing
documents shall furnish an affidavit stating whether the production is complete
in accordance with the requirement of the order.
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spection of the machine prior to the filing of the suit and thus insures the fullest
protection of plaintiff's rights.
The above mentioned statutes relating to the power of courts to order the
production of writings or other tangible objects do not affect the jurisdiction of
chancery courts regarding pure bills of discovery; they provide a concurrent
remedy.' s
A court of equity does not lose its jurisdiction to entertain a bill for
the discovery of evidence or to enjoin the trial at law until obtained,
because the powers of the courts of law have been enlarged so as to
make the equitable remedy unnecessary in some circumstances.' 9
The validity of this statement was recognized by an Illinois appellate court as
early as 1891 in Kendallville Refrigerator Co. v. Davis.20 The defendant in this
case possessed information necessary for the preparation of plaintiff's case.
Plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant wherein the defendant was to
utilize letters of patent for the construction of refrigeration and cold-storage
facilities which belonged to the plaintiff. Defendant was to pay plaintiff twenty-
five cents per square foot of construction. Following defendant's breach, plain-
tiff brought a bill of discovery to determine how much was owed to him on the
contract. The bill was granted, as only the defendant possessed records of the
extent of construction and the amount due the plaintiff.
A later Illinois case, Shaw v. Weisz,21 stated: "Discovery is incidental to
equitable relief and its purpose is to enable the plaintiff to obtain information
and prepare his cause for trial on the ultimate issue."' 22 In the products liability
example too, the information needed by A is in the exclusive possession of his
employer. The only way A can prepare his cause for trial on the ultimate issue
is by securing such information.
In Backlund v. General Motors,2 3 the court entertained a bill for discovery
arising from an injury very similar to the one mentioned in the example. Plain-
tiff was employed by General Motors and filed a pure bill for discovery in a
court of equity to examine the machine which produced the injury. The Massa-
chusetts' General Laws permit an employee, injured by his employer's defective
machine, to obtain a supreme court order to examine the machine:
Examination of condition causing injury; court order. A justice of the
superior court may, upon petition setting forth in ordinary language
that the servant or employee of a certain person, has been injured in
'8 Peyton v. Wehane 126 Conn. 382, 11 A.2d 800 (1940).
19 Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 539 (1911); see also Rickly v. Parlin & Brendorff
Co., 206 Ill. App. 599 (1916).
20 40 Ill. App. 616 (1891).
21 339 Ill. App. 630, 91 N.E. 2d 81 (1950).
22 Id at 642, 91 N.E. 2d at 87. See also Golinski v. Adler, 302 fI. App. 474, 24 N.E.2d
205 (1939) ; Village of Brookfield v. Pentis, 101 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1939).
23 352 Mass. 776, 226 N.E. 2d 555 (1967).
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the course of his employment, through some defect in the ways, works
or machinery owned or used by the employer, and that it is necessary
in order to protect the interests of the injured person that an examina-
tion should be made of the ways, works or machinery through whose
defect the injury occurred, and after such notice to the employer as
any justice of said court may direct or approve, and a hearing, grant
an order directing the employer or person in control of such ways,
works or machinery to permit the person named in said order to make
such examination, under conditions to be set forth in the order.24
In the Backlund case the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
even if the statute permitting the discovery pertaining to the defective machine
did not apply to employees, "A bill for discovery, however, would be in aid of
an existing or possible action at law permittted by General Law, Chap. 152,
Sec. 15, against a third person such as the manufacturer of the allegedly defec-
tive machine. ' ' 25 Thus, although Massachusetts provides a statutory remedy
for the kind of products liability problem discussed here, a Massachusetts
court has held that even without such a statute the remedy would be available
and be available in aid of an existing or possible action at law.28
Even when examination of tangible objects did not fall within the statute,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v.
Bresnahan,27 permitted examination by a bill of discovery. In this case the
manufacturer of an allegedly defective bottle, which exploded causing injury
to defendant, brought the bill to obtain the remnants of the bottle in order to
prepare his defense for a subsequent suit to be brought by the injured party.
The court stated:
The bill falls within the class of bills for discovery only, where no
relief is sought. Although discovery is usually sought of documents,
courts of equity have long exercised jurisdiction to grant discovery of
ordinary chattels, and even of real estate. This jurisdiction does not
depend upon statutes, but is part of the general jurisdiction of a court
of equity.2s
Thus, in jurisdictions which lack statutes designed to assist injured em-
ployees in actions against the manufacturer of defective products, recourse is
available through equity's bill of discovery.
24 Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 153, § 9.
25 Backlund v. General Motors, 352 Mass. 776, 226 N.E.2d 555 (1967). Mass. Gen. Laws,
ch. 152, § 15 reads as follows:
Where the injury for which compensation is payable was caused under circum-
stances creating a legal liability in some person other than the insured to pay
damages in respect thereof, the employee may at his option proceed either at law
against that person to recover damages or against the insurer for compensation
under this chapter, but, except as hereinafter provided, not against both.
26 See also Turner v. Guiliano, 350 Mass. 675, 216 N.E. 2d 562 (1966).
27 322 Mass. 629, 79 N.E.2d 195 (1948).
28 Id. at 630, 79 N.E.2d at 196 (emphasis added). See also, Post & Co. v. Toledo, C. &
St. L. R. Co., 144 Mass. 341, 11 N.E. 540 (1887); 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, sec.
191 (5th ed. 1941).
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DETERMINATION OF PROPER PARTY DEFENDANT
Once an injured party has established that a cause of action does exist
because of a defective machine, a bill of discovery will also provide him with
the identity of the machine's manufacturer. Again, this information could be
obtained by discovery proceedings after commencement of a suit. However, such
information is necessary prior to commencement of the suit. The employment
of the bill for this purpose has a long history. Joseph Story, a prominent writer
on equity jurisprudence, stated:
[I]n general it seems necessary, in order to maintain a bill of dis-
covery, that an action should be already commenced in another court
to which it should be auxiliary. There are exceptions to this rule, as
where the object of discovery is to ascertain who is the proper party
against whom the suit should be brought. 29
Probably two of the earliest cases employing the bill of discovery were
Heathcote v. Fleete ° and Morse v. Buckworth.31 In the former case, the bill was
for the discovery of the owner of a wharf and a barge. Certain of plaintiff's
goods were damaged when the operator negligently upset the vessel. In the latter
case, plaintiff's goods were damaged in a fire caused by the negligence of the
master or crew of a carrying ship and the bill was brought to ascertain the
ship's owners. In both instances, the bill was brought to discover the proper
defendants in a proposed suit at law. The courts granted the bills in both cases.
In Brown v. McDonald,32 a bill of discovery was brought to determine the
real owners of corporate stock. The stock allegedly was registered in the name of
a holder. The court allowed the bill of discovery against the nominal holder to
discover the identity of the real owners in order that a suit for an unpaid
assessment could be brought against the proper parties. 33 The bill has also been
used successfully in an action against a labor union for disclosure of the names
of its members,3 4 and it has been used for the purpose of obtaining united action
in matters affecting the common interests of mortgage certificate holders.35
In Bluefield Supply Co. v. Broome,36 the plaintiff alleged he sold merchan.
dise to a labor union. The union denied liability for the account. The bill was
allowed against the union's president, Broome, to enable plaintiff to secure the
names of and proceed against those members who may have been responsible
for his claim. Plaintiff alleged this information was denied him and that he
would be unable to assert his rights without it.
29 2 J. Story, Commentaries of Equity Jurisprudence, § 1483 at 728 (12th ed. 1877).
80 2 Vern. 442, 23 Eng. Reprint 883 (1702).
31 2 Vern. 443, 23 Eng. Reprint 883 (1703).
32 133 F. 897 (3rd Cir. 1905).
33 See also Post & Co. v. Toledo, C. & St. L. R. Co., 144 Mass. 341, 11 N.E. 540 (1887).
34 Bluefield Supply Co. v. Broome, 121 W. Va. 584, 5 S.E.2d 530 (1939).
35 Nemerov v. New York Title & Mortgage Co., 149 Misc. 797, 268 N.Y.S. 588 (1933).
36 121 W. Va. 584, 5 S.E.2d 530 (1939).
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In a case similar to Bluefield the court stated:
[T]here is another use of discovery, relatively rare, and that is in
situations where the plaintiff does not know the identity of those
against whom he has a claim, and brings discovery against persons
who stand in some legal or equitable relation to them in order to find
out against whom to proceed.37
In the products liability example, the employer stands in a legal or
equitable relation to the injured party and the bill of discovery provides the
means to determine against whom to proceed.
Thus ample authority exists for the use of the bill of discovery to ascertain
the proper party defendant and to secure the inspection of objects relevant to a
proposed action.
CONCLUSION
Usually, when an employee is injured, as in our example, the employer
is unwilling to afford the employee the opportunity to determine the validity of
a suit against the manufacturer of the defective machine. The employer's
hesitancy is prompted by the fear that he might be involved as a third party
defendant in a subsequent action against him by the manufacturer or distributor
of the machine. Without a bill of discovery, the injured party's rights would
not be fully protected. Thus the technological expansion and the expansion of the
liability (without negligence) of manufacturers and distributors for making
or selling hazardous products may instill new life into equity's often forgotten
bill of discovery.
THOMAS E. ROSENSTEEL
37 Brusselback v. Cago Corp., 20 F. Supp. 293, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
